BATTLEFIELD BORDERS, THREAT RHETORIC, AND THE MILITARIZATION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
The "war on terror" is a war anchored in rhetoric. 3 It is a war of abstract words -evil, good, and freedom -and words of emotion -anger, hatred, and patriotism. And as a war anchored in rhetoric, the sovereign authority possesses significant discretion in choosing the words with which to color the abstractions and shape the contours of the conflict.
This article analyzes the rhetoric of the war on terror and the particular role that rhetoric plays 
("The language of the 'war on terrorism' is not a neutral or objective reflection of policy debates and the realities of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Rather, it is a very carefully and deliberately constructed -but ultimately, artificial -discourse that was specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible, and 'good,' as well as to silence any forms of knowledge or counter-argument that would challenge the exercise of state power.").
the nation that law enforcement authorities would apprehend the suspected perpetrators, 9 the Bush administration characterized the September 11 attacks as acts of war, 10 pitting "good" versus "evil" in a "monumental struggle,"
11 and vowed to "conquer the enemy." 12 In his Address to the Nation on the day of the attacks, President Bush declared, " [W] e stand together to win the war against terrorism."
13 And in one of the clearest expressions of the shift in the Executive's conception of terrorism, President Bush declared in his 2004 State of the Union address:
I know some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.
14 Why this conceptual shift? As this section explains, shifting the paradigm under which harmful acts are conceived simultaneously shifts the sovereign's expected response to those acts: under the 9 E.g., President's Radio Address, 1 PuB. PaPerS 215, 215 (Feb. 27, 1993 ) (assuring officials that "full measure of Federal law enforcement resources will be brought to bear on this investigation," including cooperation with local ) ("Underneath our tears is the strong determination of America to win this war. . . . We're at war. There has been an act of war declared upon America by terrorists, and we will respond accordingly."); President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001 ) ("Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."). 11 President's Remarks Following a Meeting With the National Security Team, supra note 10, at 1101 ("The freedomloving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail."). 12 Id. at 1100. 13 President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11, 2001 ). 14 President's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PuB. PaPerS 81, 83-84 (Jan. 20, 2004) . Battlefield Borders criminal law paradigm, the sovereign's expected response is to investigate, arrest, and prosecute the suspect; 15 under the war paradigm, the expected response is to attack, kill, and defeat the enemy. 16 According to classical theories, both responses aim to achieve some version of "justice," 17 but the legal frameworks under which the responding government operates differ starkly. 18 The choice is one of policy, and the consequences vary significantly. 19 The "battlefield" is the notion around which these paradigmatic principles coalesce. Section A of this part shows why defining the geographic scope of the battlefield matters in establishing the operative legal framework. Sections B and C describe the positions of the Executive and the Judiciary with regard to the geographic scope of the battlefield post-September 11, 2001 . Both the Bush and Obama administrations have conceptualized the battlefield as a global one, encompassing a worldwide war against al-Qaeda. In the first few years after September 11, 2001, the Judiciary exhibited restraint in adopting a similar position, adhering to a more traditional notion of a battlefield constrained by active hostilities. As Part III posits, however, judicial restraint has waned. Courts have exhibited increased deference to the Executive on national security policy matters and, specifically, have declined to address the geographic scope of the battlefield in at least two cases that squarely presented the issue. Simultaneously, the Executive has put forward increased rhetoric concerning the threat posed by al-Qaeda "reaching into" the United States to recruit and radicalize Americans. In doing so, the Executive is shaping the conflict as a global war on a borderless battlefield, which, accordingly, includes the United States. 20 With that extension of the battlefield comes significant changes in the conception and role of state and local law enforcement.
15 E.g., Cynthia A. Brown, Divided Loyalties: Ethical Challenges for America's Law Enforcement in Post 9/11 America, 43 CaSe w. reS. J. int'l L. 651, 670 (2011) ("Police . . . enforce laws and keep the peace applying the minimal force necessary, bound by law to ensure civil liberties and protect life. The goals of law enforcement center around the capture of criminal suspects in order to bring them to trial. . . ."); Kris, supra note 5, at 19-23 (discussing the benefits of involving law enforcement and criminal law paradigm -investigation, arrest, and prosecution -in counterterrorism operations). 16 E.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 670 ("The military, employed almost exclusively against external enemies in times of war, are trained to kill by the use of overwhelming force."). 17 The "just war" theory around which the Uniform Code of Military Justice is formulated seeks to examine the "justice of war" and serves as a guide for determining whether any particular act of war is "just" or "moral." Id. at 662; see also John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War Tradition, 16 PaCe int'l l. rev. 221, 234 (2004) ("The starting point in classic just war theory was an injustice that needed to be remedied, and war was viewed as a potential way of remedying that injustice."); Mark Edward DeForrest, Just War Theory and the Recent U.S. Air Strikes Against Iraq, 1 gOnzaga J. int'l l. 4 (1997/98) (discussing the origins and principles of just war theory). 18 See infra Section II.A; see also Jackson, supra note 3, at 151 ("Re-constructing [the attacks] primarily as an 'act of war' however, conferred on the state powers reserved for the supreme emergency, as well as domestic and international justification for military-based self-defense."). 19 See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Claims and Counterclaims, wall St. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at A20 (discussing "which legal paradigm -war or law enforcement -makes most sense in meeting the threat"); Jackson, supra note 3, at 150-51 (arguing that shifting the framework under which the attacks were conceptualized "was central . . . to justifying a war-based, rather than a criminal justice-based, counter-terrorist response."). 20 See, e.g., Nick J. Sciullo, On the Language of (Counter)terrorism and the Legal Geography of Terror, 48 willamette l. rev. 317, 328 (2012) ("Because if there is not some geopolitical locus where we might act, might engage in war, then war is justifiable everywhere.").
be used to prevent the individual's escape. 26 Criminal suspects receive fundamental constitutional protections and civil liberties, including the presumption of innocence, 27 the right to due process, 28 the right to counsel, 29 the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers, 30 and the right to confront one's accusers. 31 In contrast, under the war paradigm the sovereign is lawfully permitted to use coercive, including lethal, force against any individual deemed to be part of the enemy. 32 Those fundamental individual protections under the criminal law paradigm quickly give way to the exigencies of battle. Although the laws of war afford some basic protections to enemy soldiers, those protections are a far cry from the substantive and procedural rights of criminal suspects. 33 Ultimately, when a soldier confronts an enemy during war, the soldier's fundamental mission is clear: overcome the enemy for the sake of victory. 34 Achieving that mission often demands lethal force.
35

B. The Executive: A Global War on a Worldwide Battlefield
Under both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the Executive has defined the postSeptember 11, 2001 conflict as a war on terror waged on a worldwide, borderless battlefield. 36 In his address to Congress just nine days after the attacks, President Bush intrepidly vowed to fight terror-26 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable . . . [But w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force."); see also . Opposing combatants and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities may be killed in a zone of armed conflict hostilities unless they surrender or an alternative is available and dictated by the principles of humanity."). 33 See generally Geneva IV (establishing the rights of prisoners of war). 34 E.g., Arthur Rizer and Joseph Hartman, How the War on Terror Has Militarized the Police, the atlantiC (Nov. 7, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-thepolice/248047/# (discussing the role of soldiers). 35 E.g., Blank, supra note 4, at 14-15 (noting LOAC permits use of force as "first resort against legitimate targets"); Corn, supra note 26, at 1353 ("[A]rmed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a measure of first resort."). 36 Infra Section II.B.
ism in every corner of the earth. 37 Although not as expressly expansive, the Obama Administration has echoed that policy, affirming that we are at war with al-Qaeda wherever the group's members may be.
38
In his address to the nation on the evening of September 11, 2001, the nation's response to the attacks appeared to be consistent to the response throughout preceding decades -within the criminal law paradigm: President George W. Bush proclaimed, "The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice." 39 However, the following day the administration's discourse changed. The attacks no longer necessitated law enforcement resources; to the contrary, the President declared the attacks acts of war, 40 and the necessary and appropriate response was to engage in battle. 41 In public remarks on September 12, 2001, following a meeting with the national security team, Bush proclaimed, "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. wherever "terrorism" may occur.
47
The Bush administration's aggressive position concerning the global battlefield did not wane, even as it was increasingly confronted with allegations of abusive policies and practices that were enacted shortly after the September 11 attacks. The Department of Justice, a key voice of the administration's policy positions, repeatedly argued before the courts that the United States is engaged in a global war. In Rasul v. Bush, the administration characterized the case as "aris [ing] in the midst of the global armed conflict in which the United States is currently engaged against the al Qaeda terrorist network and its supporters." 48 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the administration argued again that the United States is engaged in a global armed conflict. 49 And in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the administration boldly asserted that the "authority of the Commander in Chief to engage and defeat the enemy encompasses the capture and detention of enemy combatants wherever found, including within the Nation's borders." 50 In 2006 the acting head of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel testified before a closed session of Congress that the President was authorized to order targeted killings inside the United States on the basis of the global war on terror. 51 Taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama's administration publicly announced that it had "dropped [the phrase] 'war on terror' from its lexicon," 52 In place of the oft-cited phrase of the Bush-era, the administration asserts instead that the nation is at war with al-Qaeda. 53 Yet as an entity constrained by no borders, such rhetoric remains consistent with the notion that our nation is engaged in a global, borderless war.
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the Executive's official strategy position, again declares that the "preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents" 54 current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. . . . Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.
63
Indeed, both Presidents Bush and Obama have employed carefully crafted rhetoric concerning a worldwide war waged on a global battlefield. As Part III argues, this rhetoric, when combined with the rhetoric concerning the threat of homegrown terrorism, operates to bring the battlefield -and characteristics of the war paradigm -to within our borders.
C. The Judiciary: A More Traditional View Early On
In the first cases that eventually made their way to the courts after September 11, 2001, the federal judiciary was reluctant to accept the Executive's expansive conception of a global battlefield.
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As this section describes, the Supreme Court specifically opted to adhere to a more traditional notion of a "theater" of war or zone of conflict akin to the site of actual combat activities. Lower courts also distinguished the "hot" battlefield of Afghanistan from the United States, notwithstanding an apprehended individual's suspected threat or connection to al-Qaeda. It seemed the courts were struggling to reconcile the Executive's expansive view of the battlefield with the reality of the new, non-traditional conflict with al-Qaeda: where were the markers of war, such as artillery and trenches? Unfamiliarity with the "war on terror" led to the courts' hesitancy to baldly accept the Executive's conceptualization of the battlefield.
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The war on terror arrived to the courts in one form as cases of unlawful detention and enemy combatant designations arising from arrests and captures in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the commencement of U.S. military strikes on Afghanistan. Two paramount cases demonstrate the Judiciary's traditional view of the battlefield early on: Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, two U.S. citizens designated and detained as enemy combatants soon after September 11, 2001.
Jose Padilla was suspected of associating with al-Qaeda and of planning terrorist attacks in the United States. 66 He was not, however, accused of being a member of al-Qaeda. 67 Padilla was arrested in 2002 pursuant to a material witness warrant at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport as he returned from a trip to Pakistan.
68 After a month in maximum-security detention, the President designated Padilla an enemy combatant, and he was transferred to the high-security Naval brig in Despite the Executive's allegations that Padilla had received explosives training from al-Qaeda members, as well as instructions from high-level al-Qaeda officials to carry out attacks in the United States in the name of al-Qaeda, the Second Circuit refused to accept the government's assertion that the battlefield extends beyond the zone of active combat. 71 The court consistently distinguished between capture in Afghanistan and apprehension in the United States, holding that the President's inherent war powers imbued in his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief do not permit the detention of a U.S. citizen "seized within the country away from a zone of combat."
72
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the Second Circuit's holding on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that Padilla did not properly file his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York. 73 The majority did not reach the merits. 74 Justice Stevens did, however, echo the Second Circuit's traditional notions of the battlefield in his dissent, writing that detention of enemy soldiers may be appropriate to prevent them from returning to the battlefield, 75 a concept integral to the lawfulness of enemy combatant detention. Such detention may not, however, "be justified by the naked interest in using lawful procedures to extract information."
76 For Justice Stevens, detention of an enemy combatant on or near the "hot" battlefield, or zone of combat, is legitimate to prevent that individual from returning to the battlefield. But Padilla, from within the United States, posed little risk of returning to that active zone of combat and therefore, his indefinite, process-less detention as an enemy combatant was problematic.
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Yaser Hamdi, on the other hand, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 by members of the Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military. 78 Like Padilla, he was not accused of being a member of al-Qaeda, but he was alleged to have associated and trained with the Taliban 79 -a regime known for its support of al-Qaeda. 80 Hamdi was transferred to and detained at Guantánamo Bay for several months, and in April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, officials transferred him to the military brig in South Carolina. 81 Labeled an "enemy combatant," Hamdi was Hence, despite Hamdi and Padilla's similar connections to and associations with al-Qaeda, the locus of their apprehension strongly guided the circuit courts' analysis of their detention. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that due process required that Hamdi receive a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention due to his citizenship and the fact that he was detained in the United States, 89 the Court similarly echoed the Fourth Circuit's traditional conceptualization of a battlefield limited to the zone of active hostilities. 90 The Judiciary's reluctance to accept the Executive's expansive view of the battlefield was a natural response to the launch of the non-traditional war on terror -the courts lagged behind the executive in conceptualizing a "new" form of armed conflict. Ten years after the launch of the war, however, courts have recently exhibited the opposite reluctance -shying away from addressing the difficult question of how far the war on terror truly extends when squarely presented with the issue. In subsequent cases involving the use of force beyond Afghanistan, courts have increasingly refused to confront the issue of defining or limiting the geographic scope of the battlefield, resting instead on canons of deference to the executive. 91 Deference to the Executive -the entity defining and shaping the contours of the war -extends the battlefield far beyond Afghanistan. As such, the Ex- ecutive's mounting rhetoric of the threat of homegrown terrorism in the United States, 92 combined with the courts' refusal to scrutinize the scope of the battlefield, 93 threatens to bring the battlefield to the homeland.
iii. threat rhetOriC, hOmegrOwn terrOriSm, and the legitimaCY defiCit
Where markers of traditional war are absent, defining the battlefield is in part an exercise in rhetoric. In the nontraditional conflict labeled the war on terror, the geographic scope of the battlefield is heavily influenced by the shape, color, and reach of the Executive's rhetoric concerning the present threat of terrorism's reach and influence. Section A of this Part introduces the concept of threat rhetoric in the context of a war on terror and our modern notion of "security." Then, to demonstrate the efficacy of threat rhetoric in garnering support for the use of force and, in turn, in enlarging the geographic scope of the battlefield, Section B describes the threat rhetoric successfully employed by the Bush administration leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Section C draws parallels from the threat rhetoric surrounding the Iraq War to argue that the executive, with congressional support, is employing similar rhetoric concerning the threat of homegrown terrorism within the United States to garner support for waging the war on terror on a global battlefield and, accordingly, importing characteristics of the war paradigm into the United States. Section D argues that the homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric, premised primarily on secret intelligence in the hands of experts within the Executive, reinforces a perceived legitimacy deficit within the Judiciary so that courts are likely to exercise increasing deference to the executive on matters of post-September 11 national security. As Part IV argues, a global battlefield that includes the homeland leads to characteristics of the war paradigm employed within our borders -most notably for present purposes, the militarization of state and local law enforcement.
A. Terrorism, Threat Rhetoric, and Security
Declaring war on an indefinable abstraction like terrorism affords the Executive discretion to shape, shift, and stretch the contours of the conflict. This includes the geographic scope of the battlefield on which the conflict is waged. The war on terror is in part an exercise of power defined by the Executive's own rhetoric identifying, coloring, and shading the present threat. The Executive employs threat rhetoric to garner public support for increased executive power exercised in the name of the war. 94 And, as this part demonstrates, where our modern conception of "security" -national security -rests on expertise and secrecy, the threat rhetoric is particularly powerful. 100 A definition must include general traits common to all manifestations of the object defined: "[t]he definition is the reduction of the multiplicity of the phenomena to the unity of a common background."
101 But there is no common background for acts of terrorism: terrorism is merely a label for a particular type of political violence, but the acts to which that label is assigned defining "terrorism") . 100 See, e.g., German, supra note 98, at 29 ("Part of the problem of defining terrorism is semantic. We use one word to describe too many different things, which . . . inevitably leads to unnecessary confusion.") (citation omitted); Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1989-90 ("In order to define an object, one has to show the traits which are common to all the manifestations of that object. . . . But when terrorism is studied, that reduction appears to be doomed to fail, for the word 'terrorism' applies to phenomena which have nothing in common. Terrorism is so protean that no synthetic formula can grasp it."); Perry, supra note 97, at 252 (citing "changing nature of terrorism" as reason for lack of definitional consensus: "no definition can possible cover all varieties of terrorism that have appeared through history") (internal quotation marks omitted). 101 Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1990. have no inherent characteristics in common.
102 Simply put, "[w]hen we look for the definition of terrorism, we are the victims of a nominalistic fallacy: we believe that all the phenomena called 'terrorism' have the same nature because they have the same name."
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Terrorism is also indefinable because it is subjective. 104 Terrorism is a "performative" term 105 not a descriptive term.
106 Labeling a particular act "terrorism" does not describe the act -it condemns that act and immediately identifies an enemy. 107 The power of performance, thus, is purely in the hands of the labeler: he who employs the term "terrorism" unleashes its power.
108 Hence, the oft- It thus follows that a sovereign's declaration of war on an indefinable abstraction like terrorism begs for concretization and contextualization. Consider a traditional war fought on a traditional battlefield: the enemy army is generally uniformed and clearly defined, as are the battlefield borders. In the chaos of conflict, a traditional war is -to some degree -predictable. But the war on terror provides few markers and little predictability. 110 Who is the enemy? 111 If it is al-Qaeda, how do we identify a member of al-Qaeda? 112 Where does al-Qaeda operate? 113 Do sovereign borders in fact confine al-Qaeda?
114 Are its self-professed affiliates also enemies? 115 The responding military necessarily demands the parameters of the conflict, and the fearful public insists on knowing the contours of the threat. Threat rhetoric then permeates the gaps that the absence of a single definition of terrorism creates, providing the concretization and contextualization necessary to wage the war.
Threat rhetoric is the language employed by the sovereign -the Executive -to identify and communicate to the citizenry the internal and external threats to the homeland. 116 Notwithstanding the absence of traditional markers of conflict in the war on terror, the citizenry looks to the R]ecent work on the history of emergencies indicates that, far from being a temporary divergence from a background of normality, the rhetoric of emergency has regularly punctuated recent national discussions of both internal and external threats to order and security. In short, threat rhetoric has burrowed so deep into the fabric of our society that it may be impossible to dislodge."); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 minn. l. rev. 1789, 1850 (2010) (discussing the politics of emergency and arguing that "the President and his supporters repeatedly use emergency rhetoric to shore up public support or distract attention from failed policies").
Executive to identify, describe, and respond to threats. 117 Like terrorism, threat rhetoric is in part performative: while it may describe an actual threat to some degree, threat rhetoric also performs the function of identifying the enemy and shaping the conflict.
118
Threat rhetoric is particularly powerful in the war on terror because our collective conceptualization of "security" has shifted dramatically since the early-to-mid twentieth century from a personal "democratic security" to a collective "national security."
119 As Aziz Rana describes, before World War II security was understood as the protection of individual property and well-being. 120 Drawing on the philosophies of John Locke, it followed that individuals possessed the knowledge and reasoning necessary to best look after their own security. 121 Based on that collective knowledge, the institutions and policies employed in the interests of security were largely relegated to the "people" as democratic matters -hence, "democratic security."
122 Democratic security emphasized transparency and civilian control and deemphasized secrecy and expertization. 123 In other words, the people -collectively -were capable of discerning what was best for their own security.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, against the backdrop of economic collapse, industrialization, and the New Deal, the complexities of the new century became clear: ordinary citizens no longer understood the controlling forces nor possessed the capacity to provide for their own well being. 124 The United States faced numerous new external threats -threats to the home- ("A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect their property or to respond to forms of external violence."); see also Aziz Rana, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 wm. mitChell l. rev. 5099, 5103 (2011). 123 Rana, supra note 119, at 1451 ("Presumptions against both secrecy and heightened bureaucracy were believed to be necessary for curtailing the ability of centralized actors -particularly Executive officials and military personnel -to make unilateral judgments about defense and emergency."). 124 Id. at 1453 ("[I]n the past, the U.S. was primarily a society of independent homesteaders and artisans. This meant that individuals and families were often self-sufficient, and that as long as they had access to property or the tools of a trade, they could ensure their own material survival. By contrast, the rise of industrial wage labor and salaried work meant that individuals no longer controlled their own fortunes.").
land. 125 The external threats were complex: they were foreign, and they required specialized experts to gather and analyze intelligence from abroad. 126 The threats required shifting the U.S. foreign policy focus from diplomacy to military affairs.
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The new conceptualization of security -national security -could no longer be governed democratically.
128 While ordinary citizens may have been capable of deciding matters of their own personal security, they no longer held the capacity to decide matters of national security.
129 Democratic deliberation on national security matters, it was thought, "would only lead to conflict and to decision-making driven by special interests rather than those with actual knowledge about social conditions."
130 Thus, the notion of transparency and public decision-making fell away and was replaced by a growing industry of government experts bound by secrecy.
131 "National security" became something "pre-political" 132 and removed from democracy -an all-encompassing, "unifying commitment [that] transcended ordinary popular disagreement and thus was appropriately removed from the regular political process."
133
This commitment to secrecy and the "non-democratic" nature of national security policy is precisely why threat rhetoric is effective. With no check on the veracity or reliability of the intelligence and information guiding decision-making, the Executive is free to control the substantive information and its presentation -to shape the rhetoric. The flexibility and lack of accountability permit the Executive to shape the information, not to reflect an actual threat, but to fit policy goals. 125 Id. at 1453-54; see also Rana, supra note 122, at 5104 ("[T]he rise of totalitarian regimes meant that the United States now faced external enemies that, due to ideology, could not be deterred in the same way as old European rivals. Moreover, technological improvements -especially the rise of air power -indicated that the United States was no longer safe behind the oceans."); see also Laura 1654 ("[D]emocratic countries were losing ground to authoritarian regimes, which were more effective at exploiting new technologies."). 126 Rana, supra note 119, at 1453-54. 127 Id. 128 Id. at 1464-65 (explaining that national security powers such as intelligence gathering, technological development, and military preparedness should be centralized and insulated in the Executive Branch because the ordinary citizen was increasingly incapable of understanding the global political arena); see also Brown, supra note 15, at 655 (noting that World War I marked "turning point" for America toward militarization, "taking a major and seemingly irrevocable step in the direction of becoming a warfare or national security state") (internal quotation marks omitted). 129 Rana, supra note 119, at 1464 ("While individuals had an interest in their own physical protection, they had limited capacities to gauge the seriousness or immediacy of potential dangers [to national security]."). 130 Id. at 1440. 131 Id. at 1464-65 ("[But of significant importance was a] focus on secrecy and a rejection of old presumptions in favor of political transparency and public access. In order to respond to threats from abroad, the state needed to remain one step ahead of its potential enemies. This required developing a new formalized network of spies as well as linguistic and technological experts skilled in collecting and sifting through intelligence."). 132 Id. at 1465 ("[I]f a balance between liberty and security must be struck, security had to enjoy primacy of place as both pre-political and the foundation of American unity."). 133 Id.; see also id. at 1423-24 ("Insulated decision-makers in the Executive Branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicted information about safety and self-defense."). Battlefield Borders of force in Iraq "was a necessity[,] not a choice" 138 -that is, that the battlefield in the war on terror must extend to Iraq.
Briefly, the threat rhetoric progressed as follows: In September 2002, President Bush claimed before the United Nations General Assembly that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that the Saddam Hussein regime posed a "grave and gathering danger" 139 and a "threat to peace." 140 Thereafter, the terrorism theme of the threat rhetoric -necessary to link Iraq to the war on terror, 141 which already enjoyed public support -dominated presidential discourse. 142 At that early point, a majority of the public believed that the President should get the approval of Congress, the UN, Western allies and Arab states before confronting the threat with force.
143 By President Bush's State of the Union Address in late January 2003, however, just five months later, public opinion echoed the Executive's position -that the use of force via military action in Iraq was necessary.
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And by early March 2003, a majority of the public was persuaded that toppling the Hussein regime was necessary and worth the loss of troops. 145 We now know that the threats were false, 146 but at the time the threat rhetoric worked. 147 In just half a year, the Executive had convinced more than half the American public and Congress 148 that ). The contention here is not that linking Iraq to the war on terror was legally necessary, but that it was necessary to garner public support. A nation reeling from the September 11 terrorist attacks was more likely to collectively support retaliation for the attacks and against "terrorism" and "terrorists" generally, rather than preemptive action against a foreign regime. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 29, at 65-66 (arguing that the Iraq threat rhetoric was framed along a terrorism theme because the public was more likely to accept an invasion designed to prevent further losses, rather than an invasion intended to procure future gains). That is not to say, however, that in actuality the invasion of Iraq was not a preemptive strike. the national security danger of Iraq demanded a military response. Indeed, the rhetoric was so powerful that some congressional members who had initially been reluctant to authorize the use of force eventually "explained their votes in favor as based on their belief that the threat claims advocated by the executive department were true." 149 And even after knowing that the threats were false, the public still believed that the United States is more secure without Saddam Hussein in power.
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The Executive crafted the Iraq threat rhetoric with particularly heavy reliance on our modern conception of security and its primacy on expertise and secrecy. Controlling the sources and methods of intelligence collection 151 and then carefully selecting the information that was disseminated publicly, 152 the Bush administration shaped and colored its threat rhetoric to contextualize the indefinable war on terror, instill fear in public, and justify extending the geographic scope of the battlefield. The war on terror had arrived in Iraq.
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C. Threat Rhetoric and Homegrown Terrorism
The Bush administration's threat rhetoric leading up to the invasion of Iraq was carefully designed and executed to garner public support for the war and congressional consent for the use of force or extending the geographic scope of the battlefield in the war on terror to Iraq. The Obama administration is employing similar threat rhetoric surrounding the purported danger of al-Qaedarecruited extremists within the United States known as "homegrown terrorists." Echoed loudly by some congressional members, 154 the Executive's homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric is directed to the public to garner support for increasingly intrusive counterterrorism policies and tactics in the United States -that is, extending the geographic scope of the battlefield to the homeland and bringing characteristics of the war paradigm within our borders.
Although whispers of rhetoric from the Executive concerning the homegrown terrorism threat 149 Id. 150 Isen, supra note 144. 151 Jacobs, supra note 135, at 446 ("At the very least, members of the Bush Administration did not encourage the independent and thorough intelligen[ce] gathering and analysis that can be expected to produce the most accurate threat assessments. . . . Instead, executive department officials, particularly the Vice President, aggressively prodded intelligence analysts to discover information and provide threat assessments that would substantiate threat claims and support the use of force.").
152 Id. at 443-44 ("The President and his top officials relied on controlled information release in a number of wars to support their use of force advocacy. . . . They selectively released pieces of raw intelligence that supported their claims, without disclosing that intelligence experts disagreed about whether the evidence was significant or whether its source was credible. They did not release raw intelligence or intelligence community assessments that undercut their argument that Iraq presented an immediate threat.") (citations omitted). 153 Id., at 437 (describing that the administration repeatedly asserted as fact that Iraq had the weapons capabilities to immediately attack both its neighbors and the United States, was inclined to attack these countries, and was offering support to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda began around 2006, 155 the homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric has increased significantly since 2010. 156 The rhetoric focuses on the perceived threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates "reaching into" the U.S. to recruit and radicalize American Muslims. 157 For instance, in 2010 Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned that influential members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates "will increasingly motivate individuals toward violent extremism." 158 In a speech to Muslim communities in March 2011, Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor, warned that "al Qaeda and its adherent have increasingly turned to another troubling thematic: attempting to recruit and radicalize people to terrorism here in the United States." 159 And in language harkening back to the grand rhetoric of the Bush administration immediately after September 11, McDonough warned, "For a long time, many in the U.S. thought that our unique melting pot meant we were immune from this threat. . . . That was false hope, and false comfort. This threat is real, and it is serious." 160 The Executive perceived this threat to be so serious that in late 2011, President Obama launched the White House's official strategy to combat homegrown terrorism. 161 Entitled the "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States," 162 the plan is premised on the notion of "[p]rotecting American communities from al-Qa'ida's hateful ideology" and, specifically, protecting Muslim Americans' "sons and daughters from al-Qa'ida's murderous ideology." 163 The administration recognizes that "violent extremism in America is nothing new" and that many ideologically variant groups "have engaged in horrific violence to kill our citizens and threaten our way of life," 164 but its rhetoric focuses exclusively on the danger of al-Qaeda, the enemy in and focal point of the war on terror.
The Obama administration's threat rhetoric concerning homegrown terrorism, like the Bush administration's rhetoric leading up to the invasion of Iraq, is carefully designed: the language is consistently anchored to al-Qaeda and the group's efforts to recruit and radicalize Americans. Anchoring the rhetoric to al-Qaeda ensures a mere extension of the war on terror. And even in the face of evidence that the actual homegrown terrorism threat is not as dire as purported, 165 the rhetoric has not diminished. 166 The Executive is defining, shaping, and coloring a perceived threat to the homeland to garner public support for the use of force against individuals far from the battlefield of Afghanistan -in the United States. 167 In other words, where al-Qaeda goes, the battlefield grows.
D. The "Legitimacy Deficit" and Judicial Deference
The shift in our collective conception of security described above -from personal security to national security -has created a self-perceived legitimacy deficit in the Judiciary. 168 From executive expertise and secrecy -the hallmarks of modern national security -grew a tradition of judicial deference to the Executive that "pervades the area of national security."
169 Now more than a decade after September 11, 2001, the "new national security canon" 170 that has grown out of an increasingly deferential stance before the Executive on national security matters risks establishing national security policy as "an area over which the political branches exercise near-plenary control." 171 In the absence of judicial scrutiny over national security policy matters, particularly those as fundamental as the geographic scope of the battlefield in the war on terror, the Executive harbors substantial latitude to shape and define the conflict, making a truly "global" battlefield less of an overstatement and more of a reality. The Judiciary has internalized a self-perceived legitimacy deficit. 172 As explained above, the modern notion of national security conceptualizes the citizenry as incapable of making democratic policy choices in the best interests of national security because the citizenry does not possess the knowledge or the capacity to do so. 173 Likewise, where matters of security expertise and secrecy are invoked, the Judiciary often perceives itself as ill equipped and incapable of scrutinizing Executive security decisions.
174 "Today, a central feature of American legal and political life is the pervasive tendency of courts to tread lightly with respect to [E]xecutive [B]ranch determinations of external threat."
175 Where security expertise is invoked, courts have been increasingly unwilling to intercede.
176
Notwithstanding the courts' initial reluctance after September 11, 2001 to accept the Executive's conceptualization of a worldwide war fought on a global battlefield, 177 the Judiciary's self-perceived legitimacy deficit is leading to increased deference to the Executive as more matters of national security reach the courts.
178 From habeas review for men detained at Guantanamo Bay 179 to the justiciability of a targeted killing in Yemen 180 to accountability for torture of a U.S. citizen in a U.S. detention facility, 181 the federal Judiciary's confidence in its ability to inquire and scrutinize Executive policies on national security matters has waned significantly. Within the new national security canon, courts have altogether avoided confronting the issue of the geographic scope of the battle-172 Rana, supra note 119, at 1469-70 ("At first glance, this fact is rather surprising, given the common image of the courts as an all-knowing and elevated priesthood. Yet, the clear trend in recent decades has been the steady reduction in judicial confidence to intercede where security expertise is invoked. . . . Such a reduction in confidence underscores how judges have come to see themselves as trapped in the same law position of uncertainty as ordinary citizens andtherefore like the public writ large -ill equipped to intervene in matters of security." (internal citations omitted)). 193 In other words, the court declined to address whether the geographic scope of the battlefield extends to Yemen -a state thousands of miles from Afghanistan -in an exercise of substantial deference to the Executive. Jose Padilla's civil lawsuit similarly raised issues of the geographic scope of the battlefield, which the Fourth Circuit declined to examine. Padilla, a U.S. citizen, and his mother, Estela Lebron, sued for declaratory relief and damages based on Padilla's 2002 arrest on U.S. soil and his military detention as an "enemy combatant" in the South Carolina naval brigade. 194 The court specifically noted that Padilla's claims of abuse and torture against the high-level Executive Branch defendants sought to impose liability "for developing the global detention and interrogation policies that he contends were unconstitutional." 195 The "global detention and interrogation policies" were those developed under the authorization for the use of force -that is, under the war paradigm.
Presented squarely with the question of whether the Executive's war power authority extends to actions taken in the United States, the court refused to face the issue. Instead, the court affirmed the dismissal of Padilla's suit, declining to recognize a cause of action for Padilla's claims under the Bivens doctrine. 196 Relying on the "special factors" exception to Bivens claims, the court held that deference to the political branches on "military affairs" precluded judicial review of enemy combatant detentions, 197 seemingly regardless of where they occur. Moreover, invoking the self-perceived legitimacy deficit, the court found that "judicial review of military decisions would stray from the traditional subjects of judicial competence."
198
Eric Holder was certainly correct in his assertion that "neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan."
199
But failing to exact such scrutiny provides the Executive with near-unchecked latitude to shape the battlefield and the power to dictate where the war paradigm operates. And when the battlefield includes the United States, a necessary consequence of a truly "global" war, characteristics of the war paradigm follow. Importing characteristics of the war paradigm into domestic activities is troubling because it occurs quietly and incrementally, thereby evading widespread public attention and scrutiny. 202 In the absence of both judicial and public scrutiny, there is a substantial risk that those war paradigm characteristics will become entrenched and normalized, thereby transforming them from the temporary requirements of exigency to the permanent practices of the routine. 203 One disturbing aspect of extending the war paradigm into the United States is the increasing militarization of state and local law enforcement and the risk that the militarization will become entrenched in our culture -fundamentally shifting our collective conception of law enforcement's role toward and relationship with citizens and communities. 204 From acquiring military-grade equipment to adopting war-like tactics and behaviors, the militarization of state and local law enforcement disrupts the apt historical division between law enforcement and military activities in the U.S. and, accordingly, threatens to transform police departments from agencies designed to protect and serve the public to military units designed to quickly identify and eliminate enemies. 205 With this transformation, we risk eroding many of the fundamental constitutional protections embodied within the criminal law paradigm.
A. Historically Distinct Boundaries
The American ethos has historically drawn a distinct line between the military and civilian law enforcement -between war and peacetime. 206 "Soldiers, after all, go to war to destroy, and kill the enemy. The police, who are supposed to maintain the peace, 'are the citizens, and the citizens are the police.'" 207 This clear separation traces its origins to the early days of the Republic when our Founders, drawing from the English development of police forces, feared the persistent presence of a standing army. 208 The separation was codified just over a decade after the Civil War, as a result of the President's use of the army to enforce the law and keep order at polling places in the South during the Reconstruction era. 209 The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 210 prohibits U.S. military personnel from participating in domestic law enforcement activities, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress. The Act is a proscriptive law: facially, it imposes criminal penalties for those who employ the military to enforce civilian laws.
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B. Blurring Lines
Notwithstanding the historical origins, those stark boundaries between the military and law enforcement are blurring. A series of laws passed in the 1980s in connection with the War on Drugs, 212 beginning with the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act in 1981, 213 paved the way for increased cooperation and sharing between the military and law enforcement. 214 Moreover, the black-letter law does not prohibit law enforcement departments themselves from behaving more like soldiers than police officers. 215 In effect, the Posse Comitatus Act -and the apt division between forces with distinct objectives that it embodies -is increasingly closer to falling moot.
The war on terror has accelerated the militarization of state and local law enforcement. From body armor to assault rifles to pilotless surveillance drones to bomb robots, state and local law enforcement have indeed received the go-ahead and the resources to militarize their departments. 216 For instance, the Fargo, North Dakota police department now boasts an armored truck, "complete with a rotating turret." 217 Many beat cops now carry assault rifles, and in some jurisdictions, assault rifles are standard issue in patrol cars. 218 Approximately 17,000 local law enforcement agencies "are equipped with such military equipment as Blackhawk helicopters, machine guns, grenade launchers, battering rams, explosives, chemical sprays, body armor, night vision, rappelling gear and armored vehicles." 219 The small town of Keene, New Hampshire recently received a grant to purchase an "eight-ton armored personnel vehicle" -a tank. 220 The Nebraska State Patrol similarly boasts three "amphibious eight-wheeled tanks." 221 Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has reportedly provided more than $34 billion in grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to purchase military equipment. 222 In full riot gear wielded tear gas canisters to clear Occupy Oakland protesters, 230 one of who was critically injured after he was hit with a beanbag projectile at close range. 231 Such trends have since been duplicated in officers' encounters with other protestors throughout the country, including in Burlington, Vermont, where the police deployed riot shields, rubber bullets, and physical force to clear a group of unarmed protesters. 232 To be sure, law enforcement agencies throughout the country have demonstrated their willingness to adopt military-like tactics and behaviors before September 11, 2001 and the war on terror. 233 Most notably, the federal government's declaration of a "War on Drugs" injected millions of dollars in military equipment into state and local law enforcement agencies, 234 and thereafter police units across the country began employing heavily armed, militarized SWAT units. 235 Since then, militarized SWAT units have proliferated nationwide, 236 and are frequently "deployed" to respond to nonviolent crimes 237 and execute routine search warrants 238 -in stark opposition to the hostage situations or dangerous standoffs for which they were originally conceived. 239 battlefield in the war on terror is truly a global one risks normalizing the exception -permatizing a militarized police force throughout the United States. The threat of, effectively, a standing army executing the laws within the U.S. -the very notion feared by our Founders -is real. 247 
C. Dangerous Consequences
Although, in time, threat rhetoric may shift, permatizing the militarization of state and local law enforcement carries dangerous consequences. 248 Our fundamental conceptualization of a law enforcement officer is shifting in multiple ways, both in the minds of the officers and in the minds of the public, leading to changes in the ways in which both groups perceive each other. Accordingly, we risk inflicting damage to the paramount constitutional protections due to civilians under the criminal law paradigm. 249 public's presumption that security trumps liberty results in acceptance of increasingly intrusive and abusive practices. Ultimately, when those charged with upholding public safety approach the public as enemies, those very protections and presumptions that our police have traditionally been trained to uphold face little hope of remaining intact. 262 
v. COnCluSiOn
Through carefully crafted rhetoric of the Executive, the September 11, 2001 attacks marked a fundamental change in the ways in which we collectively regard and respond to terrorism. Whereas acts of international terrorism on U.S. soil were traditionally conceived as criminal acts and alleged terrorists as criminal suspects, the September 11, 2001 attacks were acts of war. This shift altered the legal paradigm under which the nation responded to such acts, moving from the criminal law paradigm to the war paradigm -moving from a framework of constitutional protections and the presumption of innocence to a framework of enemy designations and lethal force. Moreover, the declaration of a global war on terror permitted such action on a worldwide battlefield.
This paradigm shift was possible due to the Executive's declaration of war on an abstract phenomenon -terrorism. It is of little surprise that neither the U.S. nor international legal system has settled on a single definition of terrorism because, in practical terms, terrorism is indefinable. Accordingly, declaring war on an indefinable abstraction creates space for the Executive to harness the ambiguity of abstract words and the power of performative terms to define, shape, and color the present war on terror.
Threat rhetoric -the language employed by the Executive to identify and communicate to the citizenry the internal and external threats to the homeland -permeates the gaps that the absence of a single definition of terrorism creates, providing the concretization and contextualization necessary to wage a war. Threat rhetoric is particularly powerful in the war on terror because our notion of "security" has shifted since the early-to-mid twentieth century from a personal "democratic security" to a collective "national security" dominated by secrecy and Executive expertise. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a pertinent example of the efficacy of threat rhetoric: harnessing the power of words and control over the dissemination of accurate intelligence information, the Bush administration garnered public and congressional support for a war that later proved to be built on false premises.
In a similar pattern, the Obama administration's increasing use of threat rhetoric surrounding homegrown terrorism is aimed toward garnering public support for increasingly intrusive counterterrorism policies and tactics in the U.S. -that is, extending the geographic scope of the battlefield to the homeland and bringing characteristics of the war paradigm within our borders -absent judicial scrutiny. Though the Judiciary was initially reluctant to accept the Executive's expansive view of the battlefield, federal courts are now exercising increasing deference to the Executive on matters of national security. Indeed, when recently presented squarely with the question of the extension of the battlefield beyond Afghanistan, the courts refused to address the issue.
To avoid affording the Executive full discretion to shape the battlefield and, accordingly, import characteristics of the war paradigm into the U.S., the Judiciary must demand increased transparency from the Executive and conduct more fact-finding and exacting scrutiny in matters of national security. Not doing so risks permatizing the militarization of state and local law enforcement and, accordingly, transforming the ways in which police officers and citizens perceive each other. Disintegrating that vital separation of police forces and military units on which our nation was built threatens to erode many of the fundamental constitutional protections inherent to the U.S. criminal law paradigm.
